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TRACING RESPONSIBILITY: LEVINAS
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Hugh J. Silverman
What are the traces of  responsibility that link Merleau-Ponty to Derrida
through Levinas? How can one think this tracing of  responsibility?
What does it mean to think Levinas between Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida? The very question asks that there already be a relation between
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty and between Levinas and Derrida. But it
also suggests that there may be a relation between Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida. In what sense, then, is there a face-to-face (vis-à-vis) relation
between Levinas and each of  these two thinkers—even though, now,
sadly all three are no longer alive? And given that a relation to “the
other” in Levinas already means that there is a response by the other in
the face-to-face, the project of  asking the question of  the relation to
the other will have been, in a sense, a question of  responsibility—the
response that happens “between”—between persons, between thinkers,
between philosophies. As we know, all three thought the question of
the trace: Merleau-Ponty as a “tracé”—a tracing or tending toward
express; Levinas as the trace of  the face-to-face as alterity; Derrida as
the undecidable trace of  difference in the event of  a deconstructive
strategy. Here the question of  the tracing of  responsibility will be the
event of  an intellectual network in which continental philosophy as we
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know it today will find a certain hospitality… a place to speak… I
begin with a little story of  intellectual history.
I
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born—100 years ago—just two
years after Levinas (Merleau-Ponty in 1908, Levinas in 1906). One could
say then that they were of  the same generation. Derrida was born (in
1930) some 24 years after Levinas: another epoch, another era, another
philosophical currency. And yet the chronology belies the relationality.
Levinas came from Lithuania, spoke Russian at home (especially since
his family moved to the Ukraine during his growing years). He also
learned Hebrew, then German and some French.1 When at the age of
17 he went to Strasbourg to study Latin and then to enter the university
in the following year, he was always speaking a non-native language—
a language that he could not call his own. When, at the age of  22, he
organized for himself  a study year in Germany—across and south
along the Rhine to Freiburg-im-Breisgau — to follow Husserl’s last
year of  lectures in 1928-29, he was again speaking a language he had
learned for intellectual purposes. And when he stayed another year
(1929-30) to follow Heidegger’s first year of  lectures as Professor of
Philosophy at the University of  Freiburg, he had to shift even the
language of  phenomenology from the transcendental Husserlian variety
to the existentialized hermeneutics that Heidegger had to offer. Learning
a new philosophical language paralleled his experience of  learning a
new spoken language—and even his adopted language of  French was
never quite a space of  accentless comfort. While he learned from
Husserl’s phenomenological method, he was always critical of
philosophical methods. Heidegger, who had come to occupy the
intellectual spaces of  Freiburg at the time, showed him a new path of
thinking but one that he could never fully adopt. When he returned to
France and completed his doctoral thesis at the University of  Strasbourg
on the The Theory of  Intuition according to Husserl (published in 1930 by
Felix Alcan in Paris) he was importing something very new, unknown,
and other into the French context. Indeed, the work of  this young
man of  24 years was the first substantial introduction of  Husserlian
phenomenology into the French context. A stranger who had come to
live and study in France then in Germany for those two critical years
(1928-30), like Nietzsche’s Dionysus or Oedipus in Thebes, he came
from the outside and brought new philosophical life to the inside
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context.2 Jean-Paul Sartre (a year older than Levinas and himself  from
Alsace where Levinas had made his new home) reports having read
Levinas’s work on Husserl at the time that he himself  went to Germany
some five years after Levinas (or so we read in Simone de Beauvoir’s
autobiography). Husserl himself  at the age of  70 in his last year of
official teaching in Freiburg had been invited by the Institut d’Etudes
germaniques and the Société française de philosophie in February 1929
to give four lectures in Paris. Levinas had just received his doctorate
from the University of  Strasbourg after returning from his two year
stint in Freiburg and was invited to co-translate Husserl’s revised version
of  the lectures for publication. These lectures are the well-known
Cartesian Meditations, which appeared in 1931 under the French title
Méditations Cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie. So in many important
ways, Levinas was the crucial figure who mediated the appearance of
phenomenology in France. And only when Raymond Aron went to
the Institut Français in Berlin in 1934 and then persuaded Sartre to go
there in the following year did phenomenology make its mark on the
French scene—quite specifically in 1936 with Sartre’s The Transcendence
of  the Ego (which appeared in the journal Recherches philosophiques).
In those early years of  the 1930s, before it was fully evident
that Heidegger’s turn was taking him in the direction of  unacceptable
political commitments, the fascination with his thought, first in Levinas
(who wrote a short 1932 piece entitled “Martin Heidegger et
l’ontologie”), and then in Sartre, was nevertheless firmly rooted in a
careful reading of  Husserl’s phenomenology. At the same time, the
somewhat younger Merleau-Ponty — who was also heavily imbued
with the neo-cartesianism that he, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and others
were taught at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and who was also
fascinated by Bergson’s thought — was looking for a new way to think
human experience and to account for the nature of  perception,
including the perception of  other people. Like Sartre, he studied the
German language and looked to Husserl’s philosophy for guidance. In
the early 1930s, after the publication of  Levinas’s book on Husserl’s
theory of  intuition, Merleau-Ponty set forth his project proposals on
the “nature of  perception.” But it became evident that he would need
to study Husserl in detail in order to follow out the implications of  this
work for his interest in the nature of  perception. After the Second
World War had already begun (but before the German occupation in
1942), he wrote to Father Van Breda. In 1939, following Husserl’s death
the previous year in 1938, Van Breda had brought hundreds of
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thousands of  pages of  Husserl manuscripts to Leuven so as to escape
their destruction at the hands of  Nazi orderlies. And while Sartre was
busy developing his critique of  the Husserlian theory of  the
transcendental ego into his first magnum opus, Being and Nothingness (1943),
Merleau-Ponty at the age of  31 in April 1939 went to Leuven to read
Husserl’s later manuscripts, particularly the materials from the
unpublished 1912 Ideas II and materials from his 1935 Prague lectures
entitled The Crisis of  the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
In these studies, written after retirement, Husserl developed his notions
of  Leib (the lived body) and the Lebenswelt (the lifeworld). While Sartre
built his own essay in phenomenological ontology, Being and Nothingness,
on the diverse notions of  negation in Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty focused more on the psychological and epistemological
implications of  Husserl’s writings and their connection with how he
understood Gestalt Psychology—a theme that he carried into his
teaching at the University of  Lyon after the war and in his Sorbonne
lectures from 1948 to 1952 and where questions of relations with others
(autrui)—the experience of  others, the child’s relations with others,
intercorporeal experience, etc., permeated his thinking.
It is doubtless the case that without Levinas’s study of  Husserl’s
theory of  intuition (which elaborated the notion of  Anschauung as a
key element of  intentionality) and his translation of  the Cartesian
Meditations (which included the famous fifth meditation on
“intersubjectivity), Merleau-Ponty would not have had the necessary
occasion to elaborate his own reading and development of  Husserl’s
thought into the full-bodied theory that resulted in his 1945 thèse d’état
, his Phenomenology of  Perception. Merleau-Ponty might, indeed, have
remained a devotee of  the work of  the Gestaltists Kohler, Koffka,
Gelb, and Goldstein infused with the Bersonian vécu. At the outset of
the war, the 33 year old Levinas was drafted into the French army as an
interpreter of  Russian and German—he had become a citizen in 1930.3
But in 1940, like Sartre, as a French officer, he became a prisoner of
war (and therefore was not sent to a concentration camp). Unlike Sartre,
who escaped and returned to Paris, Levinas spent the remainder of  the
war doing forced labor in the forest. By the time Levinas’s next book
publication (most of  which he wrote while in the German military
prisoner’s camp) appeared in French in 1949, entitled En découvrant
l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger4, the work of  figures such as Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty had thoroughly eclipsed the role of  Levinas as the one
who had introduced phenomenology into France. Even Levinas’s
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lectures in 1946-47 for Jean Wahl’s Collège Philosophique on “Time and
the Other” resulting in the highly original study entitled Le temps et
l’autre (1947)—which Adriaan Peperzak describes as containing the
core ideas of  Levinas’s later work: “the Other is the center, and time, as
the ultimate horizon, determines the relations between the Other and
me” (BPW, ix)—had nowhere near the impact of  Sartre’s 1947 What is
Literature? or Merleau-Ponty’s 1948 collection of  essays entitled Sense
and Non-Sense. One might then ask, along with Sartre, who pressed the
question of  responsibility in his celebrated (and infamous) 1946 essay
“Existentialism is a Humanism” stating that one is responsible because
one responds, and responding is a free choice, who is responsible for
the success of  phenomenology in France? As Sartre puts it: “If…
existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus,
the first effect of  existentialism is that it puts every man in possession
of  himself  as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence
squarely upon his own shoulders.” (Sartre 1989)5 If  Sartre’s voluntaristic
account has weight, then it would be difficult to say who chose to be
responsible for the development of  phenomenology in France—
Levinas or Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. But if  we think of  their responding
to Levinas and Levinas responding to Husserl and Heidegger, the
question of responsibility is displaced to another place…
In 1947, Merleau-Ponty was appointed Professor of  Child
Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne (Institut de Psychologie)—
as the new replacement for Jean Piaget who returned to his native
Geneva to inaugurate his Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute for Genetic
Epistemology. In French academic circles in the early 1950s, Merleau-
Ponty’s thought was the center of  great attention, and it was not
unexpected when he was appointed to the Chair of  Philosophy at the
College de France in 1952. In the next nine years, his views and lectures
were carefully followed by students, by readers of  his editorials in Les
Temps Modernes and the popular socialist weekly l’Express, and by the
multitude of  admirers of  his thought. The posthumous The Visible and
the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty, 1964)6 was to have been a magnificent
achievement: a development of  the notion of  visibility as chiasmatically
linking the visible and the invisible, an elaboration of  his notion of
interrogation (as a replacement for both Husserlian intentionality and
Heideggerian hermeneutics), and an ontologization of  what was
primarily epistemological in his earlier thought. But Merleau-Ponty died
in 1961.
That same year (1961), Levinas published Totality and Infinity,
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his first major philosophical work in which he develops his account of
alterity, exteriority, and the face of  the other. While Merleau-Ponty’s
books began to appear in the several years after his death, among them
The Visible and the Invisible and Prose of  the World, it was now possible for
Levinas to be noticed above and beyond his fame as an interpreter of
Husserl and Heidegger. 1961 was also the year in which Levinas was
first appointed Professor of  Philosophy, first in Poitiers (1961-67), and
then at Nanterre (1967-1973), and finally at Paris-IV in 1973. At last,
Levinas was a figure to be accounted for on the philosophical scene.
He was a name in his own right, but only some 30 years after he
published his first study of  Husserl, only after two decades of
achievement by figures such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. And while
Merleau-Ponty should have completed The Visible and the Invisible
sometime around 1961, Sartre published his massive Critique of  Dialectical
Reason (volume 1) in 1960. So the impact of  Levinas’s Totality and Infinity
would take some time, especially given that it was published by Nijhoff
in Holland, signaling its connection with the Husserl publishing machine,
but not part of  the mainstream publishing scene for philosophy in
France, which was by then thoroughly dominated by Gallimard, Vrin,
and PUF (Presses Universitaires de France) for the more tried and true
works (including some of  Levinas’s own work on Husserl and
Heidegger).
On the American scene, where phenomenology was still trying
to find its place in 1961 (the Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy held its first session in 1962), Levinas was unknown because
untranslated. The first work to be published in English was Totality and
Infinity (translated by none other than Alphonso Lingis, also of
Lithuanian origins, in 1969 after he completed and published his
translation of  Merleau-Ponty’s posthumous The Visible and the Invisible).
Levinas’s The Theory of  Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology (which had first
appeared in French in 1930 at the outset of  our story) finally appeared
in 1973 in the important series edited by James M. Edie at Northwestern
University Press. Because of  the success of  Totality and Infinity, it also
made sense to translate Levinas’s early ground-breaking dissertation
on Husserl. If  I may remark, I specifically remember the appearance
of  the Northwestern University Press translation of  Levinas’s study
of  Husserl’s theory of  intuition since it was published the same year as
my own translation of  Merleau-Ponty’s Consciousness and the Acquisition
of  Language and (my soon-to-be Stony Brook colleague) David Allison’s
translation of  Jacques Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena (La Voix et le
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phénomène), whose excellent Translator’s Preface I read on the plane
from California to New York on my way to Stony Brook for a job
interview in the Spring of  1974. All three of  these works (by Levinas,
by Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida) were published by Northwestern in
1973.
Two years earlier (1971-72) while writing a doctoral thesis in
Paris as a boursier du gouvernement française and Fulbright scholar, I
had the good fortune to meet Levinas. At the time, he was teaching at
Nanterre where I was participating in Mikel Dufrenne’s seminar on
expressivity. Dufrenne had brought Levinas to Nanterre from Poitiers
and I decided to attend Levinas’s lectures as well. Even now vivid
recollections abound of  sitting in Levinas’s classroom following in
intricate detail his reading of  Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics. I
remember asking him whether he would not also be teaching his own
philosophy—after all he was by then the celebrated author of  Totality
and Infinity (1961). His response was that he would not teach his own
philosophy at the university, but rather he saw as his task to present his
interpretation of  Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. This rule
would change over time, but it was rather astonishing that a full decade
after the publication of  Totality and Infinity he still felt obligated to lecture
solely on Husserl and Heidegger. I spoke with him after class and on
the phone a number of  times that year, attended soutenances de thèses by
friends for whom Levinas was a member of  the jury, and read
assiduously his writings on Husserl and Heidegger.
The doctoral defenses were perhaps the most memorable since
they afforded the occasion to meet and talk with Levinas as well as the
other two jury members, Jacques Derrida and Mikel Dufrenne,  at the
successful candidate’s party following the public defense. Derrida whom
I also had the opportunity to hear and meet at a weekend long seminar
at the Ecole normale supérieure late that Spring was only 41 years old
at the time. Margins of  Philosophy was about to appear in 1972. But in
1967 he had already published three books of momentous occasion.
Among them L’Ecriture et la différence contained the first of  three major
essays on Levinas: “Violence and Metaphysics.” For those who had
begun to follow Derrida and who may not have been familiar with the
work of  Levinas, this was their entrée. By a curious turn of  events,
Levinas who could be traced as responsible for inaugurating
phenomenology in France and who was then placed in the background
during the heyday of  the postwar existentialist rage, returned to the
scene (like Orestes) through the writings of  a man some 24 years his
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junior. Nevertheless, the repeated reinsertion of  Levinas’s thought in
its own right, as articulated in Totality and Infinity in particular and in
Derrida’s respectful but critical readings, reaffirmed Levinas as one of
the dominant philosophers to be responded to in the later portion of
the twentieth century.
II
So what does it mean to be first and yet to be between? To be
responsible and the figure to be responded to? To be both first and
last? To be the dominant figure to whom scholars and critics,
philosophers and thinkers respond and the mark of  what follows their
responses. This is a theme which Derrida himself  took up in his farewell
to Levinas in December 1995, first in a eulogy given at Levinas’s funeral
and then in a paper given a year later in December 1996 at a two day
conference in his honor. Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas7 appeared in 1997
and contains these two thoughtful and sympathetic texts by Derrida.
In between, was a second essay by Derrida on Levinas: “At this Very
Moment in this Work Here I Am”.8
The question of  the between is signaled by the role of  the
relation to the Other which, according to Levinas, is unquestionably
prior to ontology, prior to any discourse of  Being. The face of  the
Other is prior to any form of  Being. In Levinas, there is not even the
expectation that the Other will respond, for there is, as Derrida points
out, an absolute anteriority of the face of the Other (Adieu, 4/14).
Ethics comes before and goes beyond ontology, the State, and politics;
ethics even goes beyond ethics. What I want to suggest here is that
Levinas’s thinking of  phenomenology, of  intuition, of  consciousness-
of, was anterior to the various versions of  phenomenology from
Merleau-Ponty to Sartre, and yet his own thinking of  this priority as
the priority of  ethics, as the anteriority of  the face of  the Other comes
after the dominance of  figures such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in
France and elsewhere. In effect, Levinas speaks the importance of
phenomenology through the face of  the Others. And Derrida, by
contrast, in his readings of  Levinas, first in Violence et métaphysique (1967),
then in En ce moment même dans cet ouvrage me voici. (1980), and finally in
Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas (1997) demonstrates the significance of a
certain interruption in the transition from phenomenology to its
deconstruction in Derrida’s own writings, from phenomenological
ontology and the primacy of  perception to the effects of  undecidability
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and marginality. And Levinas is perhaps one of  the best examples of
this very undecidability and marginality in the development of  French
thought, and hence raises the very question of  intellectual
responsibility…the response to the thought of  the other.
III
In order to understand this very Levinasian interruption,
consider now in detail Derrida’s Adieu—written of  course before it
became necessary to express our own adieu to Jacques Derrida in
October 2004. The first of  the two Adieu texts understands this
interruption as “a certain non-response in a response which will never
come to an end for me, as long as I live” (Adieu, 5/16). Powerful and
impressive words for the philosopher who now must speak through
the words that he has left behind since his own death—a theme that
plagued him often in the decade or so before he died. The interruption
occurs then as an endless and interminable “non-response” in each
and every response that I can give. The interruption is a between that
has no place, a rupture that comes between but does not provide an
answer. “Elle est le sans-réponse,” Derrida cites Levinas as saying (16). The
interruption, the face-to-face is the without-a-response. Death, Derrida
shows, quoting Levinas, is the death “which ‘we encounter’ ‘in the face
of  the other’ as non-response” (16). Death is an interruption in the
response of  the other. And death is not a negation: not a “annihilation,
non-being or nothingness, but a certain experience for the survivor of
the ‘without-response’ [anneantissement, le non-etre ou le néant, mais une certaine
experience, pour le survivant , du ‘sans-reponse’]” (Adieu, 6/17). “It is the
murderer who would like to identify death with nothingness [identifier la
mort au néant, c’est ce que voudrait fair le meutrier]” (6/17). Death, for Levinas,
has nothing to do with this wish to negate the other. “The face of  the
other forbids me to kill, it says to me: ‘thou shall not kill’, even if  this
possibility remains presupposed by the interdiction that makes it
impossible [Le visage d’autrui m’interdit de tuer, il me dit ‘tu ne tueras point’
meme si cette possibilité reste supposée par l’interdit qui la rend impossible]” (6/
17). But what sort of  prohibition is this? Prohibition, interdiction
(l’interdit) is a “saying between,” an interruption in what one does. The
interdit is the placing between that says what shall not be said, or done!
And this interdiction that one shall not kill is even more originary than
to be or not to be. Death, as Levinas understands it, is an infinite
interruption, like the one Derrida could feel in Levinas when talking
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with him on the phone (one that I also experienced): “the anxiety of
interruption...when, on the telephone, for example, he seemed at each
moment to fear being cut off, to fear the silence or disappearance, the
‘without-response,’ of  the other...between each sentence and sometimes
mid-sentence.” (Adieu, 9/21). Such an interruption functions as a kind
of  figure of  the non-response that is always there in the face of  the
Other, in the response of the other.
The question of  interruption returns in the second text, entitled
“Le mot d’accueil” (“The Word of  Welcome”). Here the figure of  l’accueil—
the welcoming—is precisely that of  “a welcoming where ethics
interrupts the philosophical tradition of  giving birth and foils the ruse
of the master who feigns to efface himself behind the figure of the
midwife [Diotima]” (Adieu 17/41). This approach or étude, Derrida says,
“cannot be reduced to maieutics” (17/42). It is not a question of a
teaching, or that the other already knows what is to be said or the
intellectual work finds itself  in the effort at giving birth to what is
already there.” Derrida writes:
according to Totality and Infinity, maeiutics teaches me
nothing. It reveals nothing to me. It unveils only what I
am already in a position to  know myself (ipse), capable of
knowing by myself, in this place where the self, the
same…gathers in itself capacity and knowing, power and
knowledge, and as the same, the same being-in-a-position-to,
in the property of  what is proper to it, in its very essentiality
[la maïeutique, selon Totalité et Infini, ne m’apprend rien.
Elle ne me révèle rien. Elle dévoile seulement ce que je suis à
même, déjà, de savoir moi-même (ipse), de pouvoir savoir
de moi-même, en ce lieu où le même...rassemble en lui-même
pouvoir et savoir, et comme le même, le même être-à même-
de en la propriété de son propre, en son essentialité même].
(Adieu, 42)
In the accueil, the welcoming, there is already a response to the other,
and of  the other. There is “a politics of  power with regard to the hôte,
be he the one welcoming (host) or the one being welcomed (guest) [une
politique du pouvoir quant a l’hôte, qu’il soit accueillant (host) ou accueilli (guest)]”
(42). The welcoming of  the teaching for Levinas interrupts the priority
of  the one welcoming (accueillant) in relation to the one welcomed
(acueilli). The task is “to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of
the I…to have the idea of  infinity” (Levinas, Totalité et Infini, 22; quoted
in Adieu, 18/43).
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For Levinas, one must think the opening as beginning with
hospitality or welcoming—and not the inverse. Every opening opens
on the very condition that there is at bottom a hospitality or a welcoming
of  the other. But what is important here is that the hospitality or the
welcoming should interrupt every opening—of  being, of  the one in
relation to the other. The interruption which offers hospitality or the
welcoming imposes itself  on every relation to the other. An ethics of
hospitality, Derrida suggests, a law or right or a politics of  hospitality,
will recognize this interruption in the face of  the Other. Hospitality is
the response of  the face of  the Other, but it is capacity and knowing,
power  a response that does not await a response.
The Other is the only one who can say “yes.” The first “yes”
or “oui” is always the “welcoming of  the other.” The “yes” to the Other
is already given in the accueil of  the Other. There is no First “oui,” for
the “oui” is already a response. And this is the sense in which, although
Levinas himself  first said “yes” to phenomenology and made that “yes”
evident in the French context, his cannot be considered to be the first
“yes.” Phenomenology was already in the air and Levinas would become
known as a philosopher in his own right only long after phenomenology
achieved its successes—particularly in France. Levinas’s “yes” is at best
an interruption between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida.
Levinas speaks of  “thematisation” and “la visibilité du visage” (Peace
and Proximity, 1984). This term “visibilité” is of  course linked with the
thought of  Merleau-Ponty. Visibilité is the chiasmatic linking of  the
visible and the invisible, of  the seen and the seer, of  what appears and
what does the seeing. Visibility is the making visible of  what is already
visible. Visiblity occupies no space. It is an entrelac, a chiasmen which
links and separates at once. Visibility invokes what Merleau-Ponty calls
“perceptual faith.” So what does it mean to think Levinas’s “visibility
of  the visage” (the face) in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s visiblité du visible?
If  a sculpture by Sacha Sosno is visible, it is something else to ask
about the visibility of  the sculpture—the obliteration of  the figure, the
marking out of  the full visible space, the imposition of  an abstraction
onto a figurative piece that interrupts the visible as a continuous space.
In this sense it is the interruption, the chiasmus between the figure and
the block which blocks it out, which identifies the visibility of  the
sculpture.
For Levinas, the face, le visage, has a visibility. Its visibility
interrupts the kind of  relation that philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty
had always thought characterized intersubjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s idea
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of  intersubjectivity came from Husserl. But Husserl’s notion was sorely
inadequate. Merleau-Ponty came to speak of  an entremonde, and l’autrui
for him was always a recognition of  other people as developed by the
child in growing up, as marking human freedom, as operating a certain
dialectic. When, in his later philosophy, he came to see that visibility
was even more fundamental than the relation to oneself  or the relation
to others, he was then able to see this relation as interwoven between
self  and others.
But for Levinas, the other is already visible, is already a response,
is already a face. For Levinas, visibility of  the visage is already an
engagement with the other —- even before there is the slightest
response. For Levinas, the welcoming is always reserved for the face.
Hence the welcoming is already a visibility of  the face. The welcoming,
the hospitality is already there when the face becomes visible. The
welcoming is always reserved for the face.
Derrida asks: “What bearing does this gathering have? [Quelle
portée pour ce recueillement?]” (Adieu, 36/71 translation modified).
Recueillement, linked to the Heideggerian notion of  Sammlung, sammeln,
rassemblement, gathering, indicates a sense of  the already gathered (déjà
rassemblé) in the face of  the Other. It refers to a gathering, a welcome.
“It bears on this; this is its ference, its rapport or relation” (Adieu, 36/71).
The relation is already a gate, a door, an entrance, a going-through, a
passage, a between, a relationality (un entre-deux). This relationality renders
the exteriority of  the other already interior by virtue of  its recueillement,
its entre-deux. The import (ce qui importe ici), what carries here, is the
visibility of  the face of  the other. To be at home, hospitality presumes
that a being is at home. (Etre chez soi, l’hospitalite presume un être
chez soi.) For that is where the accueil takes place—”un accueil...‘en soi’,
avant l’ethique”—even before ethics (Adieu, 39/75). “L’accueillant est d’abord
acueilli chez lui,” writes Derrida (Adieu, 79). “The one who invites is
invited by the one whome he invites. The one who receives is received,
receiving hospitality in what he takes to be his own home [L’invitant est
invité par son invité. Celui qui reçoit est reçu, il reçoit l’hospitalité dans ce qu’il tient
pour sa propre maison] (Adieu, 42/79). Hence the host gathers or receives
the received host [“l’hôte accueillant un hôte acueilli”] (Adieu, 80). But what
is also crucial here is that hospitality precedes propriety (la proprieté)
(Adieu, 45/85); any question of  ownership, of  mineness, of  Jemeinigkeit,
of  proprieté is preceded by hospitality. And we must not forget that
Levinas was not in any way “owner” of  the phenomenology that he
brought to France. The hospitality which takes the form of  a research,
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of  a gift, of  an opening was already there in the presentation of  Husserl’s
thought for the French context. And such hospitality does not require
an appreciation, an acceptance, even a response, and yet the question
of  responsibility persists.
IV
And so we arrive at the last question, the one that was in
effect the first question. According to Derrida, Levinas has produced
an equation: “metaphysics, the welcome of  the other, and ‘radical
separation’” of  the one from the other (Adieu, 47/89). Hence there is
here, in this equation, a relation and a separation, an equation, and
identity, and an alterity. “To metaphysical thought,” Levinas says, “where
a finite has the idea of  infinity—where the radical separation is produced
and, simultaneously, the relation with the other—we have reserved the
term intentionality, consciousness of…” (quoted in Adieu 47/89). Hence
for metaphysics, for this radical separation, that is, the relation with the
other that precedes every relationship with others, Levinas names this
intentionality, consciousness of… So intentionality names this radical
separation, names the relation with the other. That is, phenomenology
includes in a certain sense the fundamental metaphysics which is first
philosophy and which is what comes before everything else according
to Levinas. But at the same time, he distinguishes hospitality from
thematization. Hospitality is not thematization in itself—but rather
thematization is at the limit, on the horizon of  hospitality.
“Thematization,” writes Derrida, “already presupposes hospitality,
welcoming, intentionality, the face” (Adieu, 48/92). For “intentionality
is hospitality” (Adieu, 50/94).
“Intentionality opens, from its own threshold, in its most
general structure, as hospitality, as welcoming of  the face, as an ethics
of  hospitality, and, thus, as ethics in general” (Adieu, 50/94).This means
that every hospitality is phenomenology, experience of  existence, and
every phenomenology is a relation to the other. Furthermore, “there is
no intentionality before and without this welcoming of  the face that is
called hospitality” (Adieu, 50/94-95).
Levinas was received in France, in Strasbourg, in order to carry
out his studies. This hospitality was not given, it was, according to him,
already there, even before he requested it. In discovering
phenomenology in Germany, in importing it into France, in gathering
and welcoming French philosophy as it would have been able to have
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phenomenologized, Levinas obliterated himself behind those
philosophers of  French origin such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne,
and many others. But in obliterating himself, Levinas was at the same
time hospitality itself—for he is the one who named the relation to the
other, the hospitality with intentionality, with phenomenology itself.
Levinas was the interruption which found itself  always on the inside
of  this long history lasting over 65 years in France. Levinas made himself
the interruption at the heart of  phenomenology so that this hospitality
could live…
According to Derrida:
It is tempting to relate this interruption to the one that
introduces radical separation, that is to say, the condition
of  hospitality. For the interruption marked by ethical
discourse on the inside of  phenomenology, in its inside-
outside, is like no other. Phenomenology imposes this
interruption on itself; it interrupts itself. (Adieu, 51/96)
Phenomenological intentionality was always a relation: with Husserl, it
was the constitution of  the object by a transcendental subject; with
Sartre, it was nihilation (neantisation); with Merleau-Ponty, it was the
circuit of  existences; with Dufrenne, it was an aesthetic experience,
and so forth. With Levinas, intentionality is the relation to the other,
the face of  the other which is situated before all other personal relations
between people.
Intentionality is an interruption. “It interrupts itself  [s’interrompt
elle-même]” writes Derrida, and that means “an interrupton of  the self
by the self  as other [l’interruption de soi par soi comme autre]” (Adieu, 52/96-
97). And so it is in this sense that Levinas offers phenomenology the
possibility of  interrupting itself, of  separating itself, of  establishing a
link between Merleau-Ponty, for instance, and Derrida. Levinas is very
much himself—historically and philosophically, even ethically—the
relation between Merleau-Ponty et Derrida; and at the same time he is
the separation, the chasm and chiasm between Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida. As Derrida has written: “This fidelity that makes one unfaithful
is the respect for consciousness-of… as hospitality” (Adieu, 52/97).
The relation between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida is indeed a complex
one—and particularly across Derrida’s fidelity to the phenomenological
tradition there is at the same time an enormous infidelity on the side of
Derrida and deconstruction in relation to the phenomenological
tradition. And it is possible that across Levinas’s hospitality—his
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welcoming, the welcoming of  Levinas, the non-phenomenological
phenomenology of  Levinas—the interruption on the interior of
phenomenology is very much the place where phenomenology
interrupts himself  and where Levinas’s responsibilities can be traced
across the gap between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, between Husserl
and Heidegger, between German philosophy and French philosophy,
between transcendental phenomenology and existential
phenomenology, between a philosophy in which the other is constituted
methodologically and a philosophy in which the other is experienced
intersubjectively as belonging to an interworld in which the other is the
host and the subject is the guest, in which the ethical call is a call to
responsibility—a call for a response for which there is no other response
other than the very pre-ontological ethical relation itself.
Tracing the relation of  responsibility between Merleau-Ponty
and Derrida, marking it by the often unacknowledged position of
Levinas in this network of  relations is the inscription of  a difference
between, a between in which the very Levinasian face-to-face, vis-à-vis,
relation of  alterity marks a difference. And this difference is not
according to a theory of  “influence” or “intellectual heritage” but a
lived relation of  responsibility—a responding that happened between
each of  these philosophers such that something like a “school of
thought” took shape. Without the respond-ability, there might not be a
legacy, and without the legacy the face-to-face that we enact today might
not have found a home—a place of  hospitality, of  welcoming, of  being-
at-home, here now —entre nous—readers of  the newly named Journal
of  French Philosophy as a vital site for the growth of  continental philosophy
as we know it in our time…9
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